Authors L.K. Babenko, I.A. Pisarev, O.B. Makarevich
Month, Year 05, 2017 @en
Index UDC 004.422
Abstract Our life is more and more connected with the Internet. Naturally, it concerns politics as well. In this regard, there are already many proposals and practical implementations for solving electronic voting problems. At the same time, ensuring the security of information in the system is an important issue in the conduct of elections. We propose to consider the possibility of voting using modern achievements of cryptography at all stages of the system functioning. The main technique used to create secure protocols between the servers of the system is the encryption of various keys of different parts of the information transmitted to different recipients. We called this protocol a protocol based on blind intermediaries. Basing on this protocol it is possible to built the system of electronic voting where all necessary requirements are taken into account, namely a possibility of participating in voting only for certain people and an impossibility to match the opened personal data of people with their vote. The system is characterized by the complex performance of all necessary functions for the protection of rights at all stages: preparation, registration, voting, counting of votes. The general scheme of voting is given. The basic techniques for providing system voting are described, namely: security of confidential data transmitted, distribution of secret keys, authentication of the parties, verification of the transmitted data for integrity, temporal control of the transmitted data. Algorithms implementing a clear sequence of actions at each stage have been developed on the basis of C # .Net Framework, consisting of a set of window applications interacting with each other across the network. The efficiency of the developed system is shown. Areas of improvement of the system are noted.

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Keywords Electronic voting; cryptographic protection; .Net; system.
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