Authors L. K. Babenko, I. A. Pisarev
Month, Year 05, 2018 @en
Index UDC 004.422
Abstract The use of electronic voting is gradually replacing the traditional one. However, the issue of creating an honest and reliable electronic voting system is still open. Creating a reliable e-voting system that meets all security requirements is a difficult task. The paper presents an electronic voting system based on the principle of blind mediators using multiple ballots. Blind mediators allow you to exclude the user"s voice from communicating with any of its authentication data. The principle of multiple ballot casting is based on the use of fraudulent bulletins and allows verifying the correctness of the ballot paper without the use of evidence with zero disclosure, as well as ensuring compliance with the requirements for electronic voting systems. The architecture of the system is described, the components involved in the voting process, and their interaction with each other are described. The voting process is described, consisting of several stages: preparation, voting, counting of results. Cryptographic protocols are used, which are used for data transfer between system components. The principles of filling out the ballots are described, depending on the number of candidates and the type of voting. Types of voting are described as one of many and several of many. The compliance with the security requirements of the system is justified. The procedure for fraudulent voting is described, which is used to protect the real voice of the voter in case of possible compulsion to a certain candidate"s choice. It describes the main attacks that can be carried out with the help of malicious software on the client application, the mechanisms of protection against this or that attack are justified, as well as further ways of finalizing the system to counter attacks.

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Keywords Electronic voting; cryptographic security; cryptographic protocols; encryption.
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